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Abstract. Social behaviour arises as a result of individual agents cooperating
with each other so as to exploit the resources available in a rich and dynamic
multi-agent domain. If agents are to make use of others to help them in their
tasks, such social behaviour is critical. Underlying this cooperation is the transfer
or adoption of goals from one agent to another, a subtle and complex process that
depends on the nature of the agents involved. In this paper we analyse this pro-
cess by building upon a hierarchy previously constructed to define objects, agents
and autonomous agents. We describe the motivated self-generation of goals that
defines agent autonomy and the adoption of goals between agents that enables so-
cial behaviour. Then we consider three classes of goal adoption by objects, agents
and autonomous agents. The first of these is merely a question of instantiation,
the second requires an understanding of the relationship of the agent to others that
are engaging it, and the third amounts to a question of negotiation or persuasion.
1 Introduction
The notion of autonomy has associated with it many variations of meaning. According
to Steels, autonomous systems must be automatic systems and, in addition, they must
have the capacity to form and adapt their behaviour while operating in the environment.
Thus traditional AI systems and most robots are automatic but not autonomous — they
are not independent of the control of their designers [29]. Autonomous systems are
independent and exercise self-control. To do this, it is argued, they must be motivated.
Autonomous agents possess goals which are generated within rather than adopted
from other agents. These goals are generated from motivations which are higher-level
non-derivative components characterizing the nature of the agent. For example, con-
sider the motivation greed. This is not a goal in the classical artificial intelligence sense
since it does not specify a state of affairs to be achieved, nor is it describable in terms
of the environment. However, it may, if other motivations permit, give rise to the gen-
eration of a goal to rob a bank. The distinction between the motivation of greed and the
goal of robbing a bank is clear, with the former providing a reason to do the latter, and
the latter specifying what must be done.
This view of autonomous agents is based on the generation and transfer of goals
between entities. Specifically, an entity is an agent if it can be viewed as satisfying a
goal. This goal must first be created and then, if necessary and appropriate, transferred
to another entity. It is this adoption of goals that changes an entity from an object to an
agent, and it is the self-generation of goals that is responsible for its autonomy.
Key to understanding the nature and behaviour both of individual agents, and of
any interactions between them, is this notion of autonomy. In a series of papers, we
have described and formally specified an extended theory of agent interaction, based
on goals and motivations, which takes exactly this standpoint. The theory describes a
framework for categorising different agents [14], which has been used as a basis for
investigating aspects of the relationships between agents [16], providing an operational
account of their invocation and destruction [6] and analysing their complexity [8], as
well as for reformulating existing systems and theories [3,4,7]. In all this, however, one
aspect has either been omitted or only briefly alluded to, namely a detailed account of
the generation of goals from motivations, and goal adoption between agents. This paper
addresses that omission, by showing how the formal framework may be used to provide
a detailed operational account of the processes of goal generation and adoption.
First, we provide some context for the concept of motivation and its use in directing
reasoning and behaviour with a short review of related work, and then consider the role
of motivation in autonomous behaviour in more detail. Section 4 provides a brief out-
line of the formal agent framework, giving a selection of Z schemas that describe salient
aspects, so that a reasonable context is available within which to situate this work. Then
we analyse how motivations are used in goal generation and subsequently goal adop-
tion. At each point we describe the processes involved both informally and formally
using the Z notation. Finally, we summarise and and present concluding remarks.
2 What and Why Motivation?
According to Halliday, the word motivation does not refer to a specific set of readily
identified processes [9]. It is frequently discussed in terms of drive and incentive. Drives
are related to physiological states such as the deprivation of food, hormones, etc, while
incentives refer to external stimuli that affect motivation such as the presence of food, as
an incentive to eat. Research on motivation is currently being pursued from a variety of
perspectives including psychology and ethology. Our focus, however, is on providing an
effective control mechanism for governing the behaviour and reasoning of autonomous
agents through the use of motivations. Though we focus on a computational approach,
in this section we will discuss related work.
Some psychological research has recognised the role of motivations in reasoning
in a similar way to that suggested here. Kunda [12] informally defines motivation to
be, “any wish, desire, or preference that concerns the outcome of a given reasoning
task” and suggests that motivation affects reasoning in a variety of ways including the
accessing, constructing and evaluating of beliefs and evidence, and decision making.
Such arguments are supported by a large body of experimental research, but no attempt
is made to address the issue of how motivations may be represented or applied in a
computational context.
Computational work has also recognised the role of motivations. Simon [25] takes
motivation to be “that which controls attention at any given time,” and explores the
relation of motivation to information-processing behaviour, but from a cognitive per-
spective. Sloman [27,26] has elaborated on Simon’s work, showing how motivations
are relevant to emotions and the development of a computational theory of mind.
Problem solving can be considered to be the task of finding actions that achieve the
current goals. Typically, goals are presented to systems without regard to the problem-
solving agent so that the reasoning process is divorced from the reality of an agent in the
world. Clearly, this is inadequate for research concentrating on modelling autonomous
agents and creatures, which requires an understanding of how such goals are generated
and selected. Additionally, it is inadequate for research that aims to provide flexibility
of reasoning in a variety of contexts, regardless of concerns with modelling artificial
agents. Such flexibility can be achieved through the use of motivations which can lead
to different results even when goals remain the same [13].
In proposing to develop a ‘computational architecture of a mind’, Sloman makes
explicit mention of the need for a “store of ‘springs of action’ (motives)” [27]. In the
same paper, he tries to explicate his notion of a motive as being a representation used in
deciding what to do, including desires, wishes, tastes, preferences and ideals. The key
feature of a motive, according to Sloman, is not in the representation itself, but its role
in processing. Importantly, Sloman distinguishes between motives on the one hand, and
‘mere subgoals’ on the other. “Sometimes,” he claims, “a mere subgoal comes to be val-
ued as an end,” because of a loss of ‘reason’ information. First-order motives directly
specify goals, while second-order motives generate new motives or resolve conflicts
between competing motives — they are termed motive generators and motive com-
parators. “A motive produced by a motive generator may have the status of a desire.”
This relatively early work presents a broad picture of a two-tiered control of behaviour:
motives occupy the top level, providing the drive or urge to produce the lower level
goals that specify the behaviour itself. In subsequent work, the terminology changes
to distinguish between nonderivative motivators or goals and derivative motivators or
goals, rather than between motivators and goals themselves. Nevertheless, the notion of
derivative and nonderivative mental attitudes makes one point clear: that there are two
levels of attitude, one which is in some sense innate, and which gives rise to the other
which is produced as a result of the first.
In a different context, the second of Waltz’s ‘Eight Principles for Building an Intelli-
gent Robot’ requires the inclusion of “innate drive and evaluation systems to provide the
robot with moment-to-moment guidance for its actions.”[30] In elaborating this princi-
ple, Waltz explains that the action of a robot at a particular time should not just be deter-
mined by the current sensory inputs, but also the “desires” of the robot, such as minimiz-
ing energy expenditure (laziness), and maintaining battery power levels (hunger). This
research into robotics, artificial life, and autonomous agents and creatures has provided
the impetus for a growth of interest in modelling motivations computationally, and a
number of different representations for motivations and mechanisms for manipulating
them have been developed at both subsymbolic and symbolic levels (eg. [1,10]).
3 Motivated Behaviour in Autonomous Agents
A given stimulus does not always evoke the same response. If the external situation is
constant, differences in response must be ascribed to changes in the internal state of the
responding agent. These differences are due to the motivations of the agent.
An agent possesses a fixed range of identifiable motivations of varying strength.
These motivations can be regarded as being innate, and certain behaviours may be as-
sociated with one or more motivations. For example, the behaviour of feeding is asso-
ciated with the motivation of obtaining food, or hunger. In most cases, the execution of
such a behaviour reduces the strength of the associated motivations, so that in the case
of feeding, the motivation to obtain food is reduced. These behaviours are known as
consumatory behaviours; other behaviours which are not associated with any particular
motivation, but which make the conditions of a consumatory behaviour come true are
known as appetitive behaviours. For example, a go-to-food behaviour might make the
conditions (that there is food within reach) of the feeding behaviour become true.
This view of motivation is somewhat simplified, and although much behaviour oc-
curs in functional sequences with appetitive behaviours leading to consumatory ones,
complex interactions between motivations and behaviours are possible [11]. For ex-
ample, a single factor could directly cause many activities, or cause an action which
in turn leads to other behaviours, or even cause some motivations to decrease so that
others would increase in turn. In addition there are inhibitory relationships between be-
haviours in animals and also relationships that increase the strength of other behaviours.
Moreover, the combination of motivations may lead to different or variable behaviours.
These are all difficult issues which must be addressed in attempting to construct accu-
rate behavioural models of real and artificial agents. Our concern, however, is not with
providing such accuracy, but in constructing simple yet adequate models which will
allow effective control of behaviour.
We can define autonomous agents to be agents with a higher-level control provided
internally by motivations. Thus we can specify motivations of curiosity, safety, fear,
hunger, and so on. In a simple agent design, we might then associate the motivation
of curiosity with the goal of avoiding obstacles which, in turn, is associated with the
actions required to achieve such results. Motivations will also vary over time according
to the internal state of the agent. For example, if the agent spends a long time with-
out food, then the hunger motivation will increase. When the agent feeds, the hunger
motivation will decrease.
Each motivation thus has a strength associated with it, either variable depending on
external and internal factors, or fixed at some constant value. A motivation can thus
be represented by a triple, < m; v ; b > known as an m-triple where m is the kind of
motivation, v is a real number, the strength (or intensity [26]) value associated with
that motivation, and b is a boolean variable taking the value True when the strength
value, v , is fixed, and False when it is variable. An autonomous agent can be regarded
as embodying a set of n motivations, M , which comprises the m-triples, < m
1
; v ; b >
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n
; v ; b >. Thus the set of motivations, M , is a function of the kind of agent
being considered, while each motivation in this set at a particular point in time is a
function of an instance of a particular kind of agent and its environment together. In
order to act on motivations, a threshold value for strength may be necessary, which
must be exceeded to force action. Alternatively, the highest strength value may be used
to determine the motivation currently in control.
More sophisticated mechanisms are possible such as those described by Norman
and Long [22,23], Sloman [2,26] and Moffat and Frijda [21,20]. In addition, other rep-
resentations for motivations and mechanisms for manipulating them have been devel-
oped at both subsymbolic and symbolic levels (eg. by Schnepf [24], Maes [17–19] and
Halperin [10]). All are possible instantiations of the model described in the remainder
of this paper, but the details are unimportant at present. It is enough to note that the
abstract model provides the framework within which such mechanisms can be incorpo-
rated according to the particular need.
4 The Agent Framework
As has been described elsewhere in more detail [14], we propose a four-tiered hierarchy
comprising entities, objects, agents and autonomous agents. The basic idea underlying
this hierarchy is that all components of the world are entities. Of these entities, some are
objects, of which some, in turn, are agents and of these, some are autonomous agents.
In this section, we briefly outline the agent hierarchy. Many details are omitted — a
more complete treatment can be found in [14].
Entities can be used to group together attributes for any useful purpose without
adding a layer of functionality on top. They serve as a useful abstraction mechanism by
which they are regarded as distinct from the remainder of the environment, and which
can organise perception. An object is just something with abilities and attributes and has
no further defining characteristics. An agent is just an object that is useful, typically to
another agent, where this usefulness is defined in terms of satisfying that agent’s goals.
In other words, an agent is an object with an associated set of goals. One object may give
rise to different instantiations of agents which are created in response to another agent.
This definition of agency relies upon the existence of these other agents which provide
goals that are adopted in order to instantiate an agent. In order to escape an infinite
regress of goal adoption, we can define autonomous agents which are just agents that
can generate their own goals from motivations.
For example, a table can be an object. It has attributes specifying that it is stable,
made of wood, is brown in colour and has a flat surface. Its capabilities specify that it
can support things. If I support my computer on a table, however, then the table is my
agent for supporting the computer. The table may not actually possess the goal, but it is
certainly satisfying, or can be ascribed, my goal to support the computer. A robot which
rivets a panel onto a hull is also an agent, and if it has motivations such as hunger and
achievement, then it is an autonomous agent.
Mathematically, we can describe this view of agents and provide a complete formal
specification of it using the Z specification language. Below, we present the basic com-
ponents of the framework. Our use of the notation should be self-explanatory and we
will not, therefore, give excessive detail here, though details can be found in [28].
Before we can move to a definition of any of these entities, we must first define
some primitives. First, attributes are simply features of the world, and are the only
characteristics which are manifest. They need not be perceived by any particular entity,
but must be potentially perceivable in an omniscient sense. Second, actions are discrete
events which change the state of the environment. Third, goals are describable states
of affairs to be achieved in the environment. Finally, motivations are any desires or
preferences that can lead to the generation and adoption of goals and which affect the
outcome of the reasoning or behavioural task intended to satisfy those goals.
We define an entity to have a non-empty set of attributes, as just something identifi-
able. An object is then an entity with a non-empty set of actions or capabilities.
Entity == [attributes : PAttribute; capableof : PAction; goals : PGoal ;
motivations : PMotivation; j attributes 6= f g]
Similarly, an agent is an object with a non-empty set of goals, and an autonomous
agent is an agent with non-empty motivations. Note the use of schema inclusion for
incremental definition, by which earlier schemas are included and used subsequently.
Object == [Entity j capableof 6= f g]
Agent == [Object j goals 6= f g]
AutonomousAgent == [Agent j motivations 6= f g]
In summary, if there are attributes and capabilities, but no goals, then the entity is an
object. If there are goals but no motivations, then the entity is an agent. Finally, if neither
the motivation nor goal sets are empty, then the entity is an autonomous agent. Thus,
we have constructed a formal specification which identifies and characterises agents
and autonomous agents. Most usefully, perhaps, the specification is constructed in such
a way as to allow further levels of specification to be added to describe particular agent
designs and architectures.
5 Goal Generation
The framework described above involves the generation of goals from motivations in
an autonomous agent, and the adoption of goals by, and in order to create, other agents.
In this section, we build on earlier initial work in outlining goal generation and adop-
tion [5]. We give a complete description and specification of how an autonomous agent,
defined in terms of its high-level and somewhat abstract motivations, can construct
goals. Earlier work, while describing the introduction of goals, did not consider the
later stages of releasing entities from agency obligations, an omission corrected here.
An autonomous agent will try to find a way to mitigate motivations, either by select-
ing an action to achieve an existing goal as above for simple agents, or by retrieving a
goal from a repository of known goals. Thus, our model requires a repository of known
goals which capture knowledge of limited and well-defined aspects of the world. These
goals describe particular states or sub-states of the world with each autonomous agent
having its own such repository.
As stated elsewhere [16], in order to retrieve goals to mitigate motivations, an au-
tonomous agent must have some way of assessing the effects of competing or alternative
goals. Clearly, the goals which make the greatest positive contribution to the motiva-
tions of the agent should be selected unless a greater motivational effect can be achieved
by destroying some subset of its goals. The motivational effect of generating or destroy-
ing goals not only depends on the motivations but also on the goals of the agent. For
example, an autonomous agent should not generate a goal that it already possesses or
that is incompatible with the achievement or satisfaction of its existing goals.
Formally, the ability of autonomous agents to assess goals is given in the next
schema, AssessGoals . The schema describes how an autonomous agent monitors its
motivations for goal generation. First, the AutonomousAgent schema is included and
the new variable representing the repository of available known goals, goalbase is de-
clared. Then, the motivational effect on an autonomous agent of satisfying a set of new
goals is given. The motiveectgenerate function returns a numeric value represent-
ing the motivational effect of satisfying a set of goals with a particular configuration
of motivations and a set of existing goals. Similarly, the motiveectdestroy function
returns a numeric value representing the motivational effect of removing some subset
of its existing goals with the same configuration. The predicate part specifies that the
goal base is non-empty, and that all the current goals must be goals that exist in the
goalbase. For ease of expression, we also define a satisfygenerate function, related to
motiveectgenerate, which returns the motivational effect of an autonomous agent sat-
isfying an additional set of goals. The satisfydestroy function is defined analogously.
AssessGoals
AutonomousAgent
goalbase : PGoal
motiveectgenerate : PMotivation ! PGoal ! PGoal ! Z
motiveectdestroy : PMotivation ! PGoal ! PGoal ! Z
satisfygenerate : PGoal ! Z
satisfydestroy : PGoal ! Z
goalbase 6= fg
goals  goalbase
8 gs : P goalbase 
(satisfygenerate gs = motiveectgenerate motivations goals gs) ^
(satisfydestroy gs = motiveectdestroy motivations goals gs)
Now we can describe the generation of a new set of goals in the GenerateGoals
operation schema. First, the agent changes, indicated by AutonomousAgent , and the
previous schema is included. The predicate part simply states that there is a set of goals
in the goalbase that has a greater motivational effect than any other set of goals, and the
current goals of the agent are updated to include the new goals.
GenerateGoals
AutonomousAgent
AssessGoals
goalbase 6= f g
9 gs : PGoal j gs  goalbase 
(8 os : PGoal j os 2 (P goalbase) 
(satisfygenerate gs  satisfygenerate os) ^
goals
0
= goals [ gs)
Once generated by an autonomous agent, goals exist in multi-agent system until,
for whatever reason, they are explicitly destroyed by that autonomous agent. This rep-
resents the end of the life of a goal. The destruction of goals is defined in a similar
way to the generation of goals, and formally in DestroyGoals . This schema states that
an agent destroys the subset of its goals, the destruction of which provide the greatest
motivational benefit.
DestroyGoals
AutonomousAgent
AssessGoals
goalbase 6= f g
9 gs : PGoal j gs  goalbase 
(8 os : PGoal j os 2 (P goalbase) 
(satisfydestroy gs  satisfydestroy os) ^
goals
0
= goals n gs)
6 Goal Adoption
Since we are interested in multi-agent worlds, we must consider the world as a whole
rather than just individual agents. In this world, all autonomous agents are agents and all
agents are objects. We also identify further sub-categories of entity. Before proceeding,
therefore, we distinguish those objects which are not agents, and those agents which are
not autonomous and refer to them as neutral-objects and server-agents respectively.
An agent is then either a server-agent or an autonomous agent, and an object is
either a neutral-object or an agent.
NeutralObject == [Object j goals = fg]
ServerAgent == [Agent j motivations = fg]
We can then describe the world as a collection of neutral objects, server agents and
autonomous agents.
World
entities : PEntity
objects : PObject
agents : PAgent
autonomousagents : PAutonomousAgent
neutralobjects : PNeutralObject
serveragents : PServerAgent
autonomousagents  agents  objects
agents = autonomousagents [ serveragents
objects = neutralobjects [ agents
In multi-agent systems agents may wish, or need, to use the capabilities of other
entities. They can make use of the capabilities of these others by adopting their goals.
For example, if Anne needs to move a table which cannot be lifted alone, she must
get someone else to adopt her goal before it can be moved. Similarly, if she wants
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Fig. 1. Goal Adoption in Non-Autonomous and Autonomous Agents
tea, then she must make use of a kettle to boil water, a teapot to make the tea and
subsequently a cup from which to drink it. Each of these objects can be ascribed, or
viewed, as adopting Anne’s goals in order that her thirst can be relieved. This notion
of goal adoption underlies social behaviour, and an understanding of the ways in which
in can be achieved is fundamental for effective modelling and simulation. In general,
entities may serve the purposes of others by adopting their goals. However, the ways
in which they adopt goals depends on the kind of object. They may be either neutral-
objects, server-agents or autonomous agents, and each requires a separate analysis by
the agent with a goal to be adopted, which we call the viewing agent.
In the description given in the previous section, goals may be generated only by
autonomous agents. Both non-autonomous (server) and autonomous agents, however,
can adopt goals. With autonomous agents, goal adoption amounts to a problem of ne-
gotiation or persuasion, requiring an analysis of the target autonomous agent. With
non-autonomous agents, goal adoption requires an analysis of both the agent intended
to adopt the goal, and any other agent engaging that agent. With objects, no analysis is
required, since agents are created from objects with the relevant associated goals.
Figure 1 shows three fundamental cases of goal adoption which we consider in
detail below. In the figure, there are three kinds of agent. A target agent or object is
one that is intended to adopt goals. An engaging agent is one whose goals are currently
(already) adopted by the target agent. A viewing agent is an agent that seeks to engage a
target agent or object by having it adopt goals. It is a viewing agent because the way in
which goal adoption is attempted is determined by its view of the situation. We consider
the three cases of goal adoption below.
6.1 Goal Adoption by Neutral Objects
In the simplest case, goal adoption by non-autonomous agents occurs by instantiating
an agent from a neutral object with the goals to be adopted. In this case, no agent exists
before the goals are adopted, but the act of goal transfer causes an agent to be created
from a neutral object using those particular goals. Thus, for example, a cup in Anne
and Bill’s office, which is just an neutral-object, becomes an agent when it is used for
storing Anne’s tea. In this case it adopts or is ascribed her goal of storing liquid. It is
possible to create the agent from the object because the cup is not being used by anyone
else; it is not engaged by another agent. An entity can only be a neutral object if it is
not engaged.
Below, we specify a function that creates a new entity by ascribing a set of goals
to an existing entity. It is total, valid for any entity and any set of goals, and is just a
formal way of associating goals with an entity, and will be used subsequently.
EntityAdoptGoals : (Entity  PGoal) ! Entity
8 gs : PGoal ; old ;new : Entity 
EntityAdoptGoals(old ; gs) = new , new :goals = old :goals [ gs
^ new :capableof = old :capableof ^ new :attributes = old :attributes
We now specify how a non-autonomous disengaged object, or neutral-object is
instantiated as a server-agent. In Z, a variable with a ‘?’ indicates an input. Thus, a
neutral-object and a set of goals are input, the entities in the world change, indicated
by World , and the sets of objects and agents are updated accordingly. First, the set
of neutral objects no longer includes the originally disengaged object. Second, the set
of server agents now includes the newly created server-agent. Finally, the schema states
that there is no change to the set of autonomous agents. In addition, the variables,
entities , objects and agents , are updated by removing the neutral-object and adding
the newly instantiated server-agent. The final three predicates are redundant since they
necessarily follow from the previous predicates, but are included to detail how all the
state variables are affected. In subsequent schemas, such redundancy is not included.
NeutralObjectAdoptGoals
o? : NeutralObject
gs? : PGoal
World
o? 2 neutralobjects
neutralobjects
0
= neutralobjects n fo?g
serveragents
0
= serveragents [ fEntityAdoptGoals (o?; gs?)g
autonomousagents
0
= autonomousagents
entities
0
= entities n fo?g [ fEntityAdoptGoals (o?; gs?)g
objects
0
= objects n fo?g [ fEntityAdoptGoals (o?; gs?)g
agents
0
= agents n fo?g [ fEntityAdoptGoals (o?; gs?)g
For completeness, we specify the related operation where an entity is released from
all of its agency obligations. Here, a server-agent reverts from a server-agent to a
neutral-object. It is possible that a cup can be engaged for two separate goals. For ex-
ample, it may be engaged as a vase for flowers and as a paper-weight for loose papers
if there is a breeze coming from a nearby open window. If the window is closed and the
flowers are removed, the cup is released from all its agency obligations and reverts to
being a neutral-object.
Formally, this operation is defined by the RevertToNeutralObject schema. It uses
the axiomatic function, EntityRemoveGoals , defined similarly to EntityAdoptGoals ,
which removes a set of goals from an entity.
EntityRemoveGoals : (Entity  PGoal) ! Entity
8 gs : PGoal ; old ;new : Entity 
EntityRemoveGoals(old ; gs) = new , new :goals = old :goals n gs
^ new :capabilities = old :capabilities ^ new :attributes = old :attributes
The predicates in the following schema check that the input goals are the same as
the set of current goals of the server-agent. This ensures that the server-agent is released
from all of its agency obligations. The variables, neutralobjects , serveragents and
autonomousagents , are updated accordingly.
RevertToNeutralObject
sa? : ServerAgent
gs? : PGoal
MultiAgentSystem
sa? 2 serveragents
gs? = sa?:goals
neutralobjects
0
= neutralobjects [ fEntityRemoveGoals (sa?; sa?:goals)g
serveragents
0
= serveragents n fsa?g
autonomousagents
0
= autonomousagents
6.2 Goal Adoption by Server Agents
If the target object is engaged by other agents then it is itself an agent, so the protocol for
goal adoption changes. In this case, there are several ways to engage the target object.
The first involves supplying the target object with more goals that does not affect
the existing agency obligations. In this case the agent is shared between the viewing
agent and the existing engaging agents. The second involves trying to persuade any en-
gaging agents to release the engaged object so that it becomes a neutral-object and can
therefore subsequently be engaged by the viewing agent as required. (This may relate to
the issue of goal adoption for autonomous agents, which is considered later). The third
possibility involves displacing the engaging agent so that the engaged object becomes
a neutral-object and can then subsequently be ascribed other goals. This possibility is
dangerous since it may cause conflict with the previous engaging agents.
As an example, suppose that a cup is currently in use as a paper-weight for Anne,
so that the cup is Anne’s agent with her goal of securing loose papers. Suppose also,
that Bill wishes to use the cup to have some tea. The first way for Bill to engage the cup
is for him to attempt to use the cup without destroying the existing agency relationship
between Anne and the cup. Since this would involve an awkward attempt at making tea
in, and subsequently drinking from, a stationary cup, he may decide instead to try other
alternatives. The second alternative is to negotiate with Anne to release the cup so that
it can be used for storing tea while the third alternative is for Bill to displace the goal
ascribed to the cup by removing the cup from the desk and pouring tea into it. The cup
is no longer an agent for Anne and is now ascribed the goal of storing tea for Bill. It has
switched from being engaged by Anne to being engaged by Bill, and this is equivalent
to the agent reverting to an object and then being re-instantiated as a new agent. This
method may not be an appropriate strategy, however, because in destroying the agency
obligation of the cup as a paper-weight, there is a risk of conflict between Anne and
Bill.
The adoption of goals by server-agents is formalised in the next schema, in which
a server-agent is ascribed an additional set of goals. It describes the alternative where
the cup is serving as a paper weight and is then subsequently given the goal of storing
flowers. The schema checks that the adopting agent is a server-agent in the system and
that the new goals are distinct from the existing goals.
ServerAgentAdoptGoals
a? : ServerAgent
gs? : PGoal
World
a? 2 serveragents
gs? \ a?:goals = fg
neutralobjects
0
= neutralobjects
serveragents
0
= serveragents n fa?g [ fEntityAdoptGoals (a?; gs?)g
autonomousagents
0
= autonomousagents
In some situations, a server-agent is released from some but not all of its agency
obligations. Suppose, for example, that a window is open in A’s office and that a cup
is being used as a paperweight by A and a vase by B. If the window is subsequently
closed, then the cup may be released from its agency obligations as a paperweight but
still remain an agent because it is holding flowers. Formally, the operation schema rep-
resenting this change of agency obligation is specified in the next schema. Notice that
the goals that are removed from an agent in this operation must be a proper subset of
its goals. The server-agent, sa?, is removed from the set of server-agents and replaced
with the agent that results from removing the goals, gs?, from a?.
ServerAgentReleaseGoals
sa? : ServerAgent
gs? : PGoal
MultiAgentSystem
sa? 2 serveragents
gs?  sa?:goals
neutralobjects
0
= neutralobjects
serveragents
0
= serveragents n fsa?g [ fEntityRemoveGoals (sa?; gs?)g
autonomousagents
0
= autonomousagents
6.3 Goal Adoption by Autonomous Agents
In the example above, the second possibility for goal adoption by server-agents involves
Bill persuading Anne to first release the cup from its existing agency. The cup would
then become a neutral-object and could be instantiated as required by Bill. In general,
such persuasion or negotiation may be more difficult than the direct physical action re-
quired for goal adoption in non-autonomous entities. Autonomous agents are motivated
and as such, only participate in an activity and assist others if it is to their motivational
advantage to do so (that is, if there is some motivational benefit). They create their own
agendas and for them, goal adoption is a voluntary process as opposed to an obligatory
one for non-autonomous agents. In a similar example, Anne might ask Bill to assist in
moving a table, but Bill may refuse.
Formally, the operation of an autonomous agent adopting the goals of another is
specified in the following schema where the set of autonomous agents is updated to
include the newly instantiated target autonomous agent. Note that this does not detail
the persuasion involved, but simply the state change resulting from the goal adoption.
AutonomousAgentAdoptGoals
AssessGoals
aa? : AutonomousAgent
gs? : PGoal
World
aa? 2 autonomousagents
autonomousagents
0
= autonomousagents n faa?g[
fEntityAdoptGoals (aa?; gs?)g
agents
0
= agents
objects
0
= objects
: (9 hs : PGoal j hs  goalbase ^ hs 6= gs? 
satisfygenerate hs > satisfygenerate gs?)
In general, goals must be adopted through explicit autonomous agent initiative, as
opposed to an ascription of goals for non-autonomous agents. However, in some con-
texts the ascription of goals to autonomous agents may be meaningful. Suppose, as a
dramatic yet unlikely example, that Anne incapacitates Bill in some way and places him
by the door to function as a draft excluder. In this situation, the autonomous agent, Bill
could be ascribed the goal of keeping out the draft even though he has not explicitly
adopted this goal. Such cases can be described by considering the autonomous agent as
an agent in an obligatory relationship. In this thesis, however, we restrict autonomous
goal adoption to the explicit and voluntary generation of goals that have been recog-
nised in others. In our view, this is the only case in which cooperation takes place as
opposed to mere engagement [16].
6.4 Autonomous Goal Destruction
For a number of reasons an autonomous agent may destroy adopted goals. For example,
suppose Anne wishes to move a table and has persuaded Bill to help. If Anne subse-
quently destroys some important agency relationship of Bill’s, it is possible that Bill
may then destroy the goal he has adopted from Anne of moving the table. As with
goal adoption, for an autonomous agent to destroy goals, this must be considered the
most motivationally beneficial course of action. This scenario is formalised below and
is similar to the previous schema.
AutonomousAgentDestroysGoals
aa? : AutonomousAgent
gs? : PGoal
MultiAgentSystem
AssessGoals
aa? 2 autonomousagents
gs?  aa?:goals
autonomousagents
0
= (autonomousagents n faa?g) [
fEntityRemoveGoals (aa?; gs?)g
agents
0
= agents ^ objects
0
= objects
7 Discussion
Social behaviour by which individual agents interact and cooperate is an intricate and
complex process which both structures and depends on the distribution of goals in a
global system. If target agents are already involved in significant social interactions
with others, it may not be possible to initiate new interactions with them. If such new
interaction is possible, however, this will change the distribution of goals among agents
in the system, potentially impacting on existing relationships, and certainly imposing
structure to constrain new ones. In any of these situations, such social behaviour can
only arise through the generation of goals by one agent, and the adoption of goals
by another. The preceding sections have provided an operational specification of these
processes so that the roles of goals and motivations are clarified and explicated.
Using the Z notation provides a way to formalise these mechanisms which first
removes ambiguity from the analysis, and second enables an easy transition to be made
to practical systems. Moreover, the specification of goal generation and adoption is
one part of a much larger yet integrated theory of agent interaction which covers agent
taxonomy [14], formal systems specification [15,4], agent relationships [16], and the
construction of implemented agent systems [16].
Research on motivation is currently being pursued from a variety of perspectives
including psychology and ethology, while computational research into motivation is
also significant. The notion of motivation is not new. Simon, for example, takes moti-
vation to be “that which controls attention at any given time,” [25]. Sloman [26] has
elaborated on Simon’s work, showing how motivations are relevant to emotions and
the development of a computational theory of mind. Others have used motivation and
related notions in developing computational architectures for autonomous agents such
as the motives of Norman and Long [22], and the concerns of Moffat and Frijda [20].
What is new about the current work is the role of motivation in defining autonomy and
in enabling goal generation and adoption.
The agent hierarchy distinguishes clearly between objects, agents and autonomous
agents in terms of goals and motivations. Such an analysis of the entities in the world
not only provides appropriate structures so that different levels of functionality may be
established, but also information as to how multiple entities or agents can cooperate to
solve problems which could not be solved alone. By basing the distinctions on function
and purpose, we do not arbitrarily differentiate between cups and robots, for example,
especially when it is not useful to do so. Instead, our motivation and goal based analysis
allows us to concentrate precisely on important aspects of multi-agent interaction and
problem-solving. In that context, we have considered the roles of goal generation and
adoption. We have specified how and why goals must be generated in some autonomous
agents in response to motivations, grounding chains of goal adoption, and further, how
goals are adopted by objects, agents and autonomous agents in this agent model.
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